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Civil society and the state in Uganda’s 
AIDS response 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper investigates state-civil society relations in the Ugandan AIDS 
response through a critical exploration of the history of Uganda’s ‘multi-
sectoral’ and ‘partnership’ approaches, particularly as it pertains to The AIDS 
Support Organisation (TASO). It finds that the Ugandan government’s 
reputation for successful prevention campaigns is not necessarily deserved, and 
that the effectiveness of civil society is limited by an authoritarian political 
culture. Despite these limitations, however, state-civil society partnership did 
contribute to the emergence of a relatively effective coalition for action against 
HIV/AIDS. Donors were essential in encouraging the emergence of this 
coalition, but have also inadvertently undermined the emergence of strong and 
independent civil society voices able to hold the Ugandan state accountable. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Uganda experienced one of the earliest large-scale HIV epidemics in Sub-
Saharan Africa, but gained a reputation for a highly effective response to, and 
strong political leadership on HIV/AIDS. It is often considered a model for 
addressing HIV/AIDS in resource-poor settings (Youde, 2007: 1). Both the 
personal leadership of President Yoweri Museveni and appropriate public policy 
are seen as critical success factors – as is the effective civil society response 
spear-headed by The AIDS Support Organisation (TASO). Indeed, the 
relationship between the state, donors and civil society is widely understood as a 
productive partnership, making up for weaknesses in state capacity where 
necessary.  
 
This paper critically investigates state and civil society leadership on AIDS in 
Uganda through the lens of TASO’s growth and evolution in the context of a 
supportive but relatively authoritarian state. A particular focus is on whether 
TASO has managed to improve service delivery, not only directly1 – by 
                                           
1
 Bukenya (2012) has shown that in addition to direct service delivery, TASO has attempted 
to build state capacity within the public healthcare system through knowledge and skills 
transfer, etc. 
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providing services the state lacked the capacity to provide – but also by ‘holding 
government to account’ on HIV/AIDS policy and service provision. It has been 
suggested that civil society did so in South Africa and Brazil (Nunn et al., 
2012), through various approaches including litigative strategies (Meier and 
Yamin, 2011). The analysis reported in this paper bears out neither a story of 
exemplary leadership from the Museveni government nor of civil society 
‘holding government to account’. However, it does illustrate that state-civil 
society partnership contributed to the emergence of a relatively effective ‘AIDS 
response coalition’. Donors had a critical (but not unambiguously positive) role 
in the emergence of this coalition. 
 
The research primarily draws on key informant interviews conducted with 
leaders in civil society, government officials, donor representatives and 
healthcare workers in Uganda as well as documentary sources and secondary 
literature. Informants named in this paper were (or still are) public figures and 
consented to be quoted and named in publications arising from the study.
2
 
 
2. ‘AIDS leadership’ and coalition-building 
 
Leadership is increasingly seen as critical to curbing HIV transmission and 
implementing AIDS treatment programmes. This argument is perhaps most 
closely associated with former UNAIDS Executive Director, Peter Piot (see Piot 
and Coll-Seck, 2001; Piot, 2012), but the notion of ‘AIDS leadership’ is 
complex and under-theorised (Grebe, 2012). It is primarily used in the sense of 
‘political commitment’ from national political leaders, i.e. a willingness to talk 
about and address AIDS as a policy priority (see for example Bor, 2007), but is 
also used by Piot and Coll-Seck to refer to the ability of leaders to mobilise 
society-wide collective efforts. This can be thought of as building ‘coalitions’3 
for effective responses and involves both state and civil society leadership 
(Grebe 2012: 13-24).  
 
Partnerships between civil society and the state, or their absence, have been used 
to help explain good and poor policy outcomes in Brazil and South Africa 
respectively (e.g. in Nunn et al., 2012). However, this analysis is too simplistic 
to enable a sufficient understanding of the AIDS response in Uganda, where 
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 Informed consent was obtained from all informants. Informants were given the option of 
remaining anonymous and to provide portions of or their entire interview ‘off-the-record’ or 
on a non-attributable basis. In all cases where such requests were made, these have been 
respected. 
3
 For a more thorough elaboration of the theoretical underpinnings of coalitions as drivers of 
political and policy outcomes see Yashar (1997) and Leftwich and Hogg (2007). 
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state-civil society partnership, state repression (or the threat thereof), civil 
society service delivery and the actions of international actors all appear very 
significant for policy and service delivery outcomes. In poor, aid-dependent 
countries like Uganda, the role of donors is likely to be very significant. 
Drawing ‘lessons’ about the Ugandan experience thus ideally ought to be based 
on an evaluation of  state and civil society leadership as well as the character of 
state-donor-civil society relations.  
 
The paper starts with a description of the context within which Uganda emerged 
as an ‘African success story’ on AIDS and a critical evaluation of state 
leadership on AIDS. It then turns to the emergence and evolution of TASO 
before analysing its functioning within the particular institutional and political 
context of Uganda during the 1990s and 2000s. Particular attention is paid to the 
opportunities provided and constraints imposed by this context and by the 
choices of the Ugandan government and donors. 
 
 
3. State leadership and the making of an 
‘African success story’ 
In the late 1970s, North Western Tanzania and Southern Uganda probably 
constituted the epicentre of the African HIV epidemic (Epstein, 2007). By the 
mid-1980s many communities were being ravaged by the disease locally known 
as ‘slim’ (O’Manique, 2004; Thornton, 2008). The situation was exacerbated by 
the insecurity and social upheaval of a bloody civil war lasting from 1981 to 
1986 that contributed to widespread fear and confusion and rendered any 
systematic state response nearly impossible. 
By the time Museveni’s National Resistance Army took power in January 1986, 
AIDS constituted a public health crisis that could also threaten economic 
reconstruction and even the stability of the new regime.4 The Museveni 
government started responding meaningfully to HIV shortly after coming to 
power. Prevention campaigns involved the President himself speaking openly 
about the risks of contracting HIV through sex and featured the so-called ‘zero 
grazing’ (partner reduction) and ABC (‘Abstain, Be faithful, Condomize’) 
messages. A subcommittee that had been set up by the second Obote 
                                           
4
 It has, in fact, been argued that Museveni – whose power base was the army – was shocked 
to discover that significant numbers of soldiers were HIV-positive. Museveni himself has 
recounted an incident where a significant proportion of Ugandan army officers sent to Cuba 
for training tested positive for HIV and Cuban President Fidel Castro personally informed 
Museveni of the problem (Garbus and Marseille, 2003, cited in Ostergard and Barcello, 2005; 
De Waal, 2006: 97). 
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government was upgraded to the National Committee for the Prevention of 
AIDS (NCPA) in October 1986 and a World Health Organisation mission to 
Uganda in January 1987 helped draw up a short-term intervention plan and a 
medium-term five-year action plan. These plans formed the basis of the Aids 
Control Programme (the first in Africa) and a donor conference in May 1987. 
The President made a number of high-profile speeches in which he drew 
attention to AIDS, and in December 1988 he declared AIDS a major national 
priority, calling for an all-out public education campaign. This openness and 
willingness to tackle the issue of HIV and risky sex stood in sharp contrast to 
most African governments at the time (Piot, personal communication, 2010).
5
 
But Uganda’s status as a ‘poster child’ for good governmental leadership on 
AIDS and Museveni’s reputation as an exceptional African leader were probably 
cemented when it became apparent in the mid-1990s that HIV prevalence had 
started to decline, turning Uganda into the first African HIV prevention ‘success 
story’. What exactly led to the decline in HIV prevalence is uncertain, and there 
has been considerable debate among scholars about the relative importance of 
different factors (see, for example, Gray et al., 2006; Green et al., 2006; Merson, 
2006; Thornton, 2008; Atzori et al., 2009). Changes in sexual behaviour – in 
particular reductions in the number of concurrent partners – are generally 
thought to have played a significant role (Stoneburner and Low-Beer, 2004; 
Low-Beer and Stoneburner, 2004). This is usually attributed to the prevention 
campaigns, while Thornton (2008: 33) emphasises the effects of the 
configuration of sexual networks on HIV trends and Epstein (2007: 160) argues 
that the many small community-based AIDS groups that were founded during 
the 1980s and early 1990s deserve much of the credit for changing sexual 
norms.  
The Ugandan government attracted substantial credit for the apparently radical 
behaviour changes that would explain declining HIV prevalence (e.g. UNAIDS, 
1998; 2001). But while it is undeniably due some credit, the degree to which its 
prevention campaigns shaped the evolution of the epidemic is debatable. 
Epidemiological evidence calls into question the hypothesis that declines in HIV 
prevalence resulted primarily from prevention interventions (although this is not 
to say that those efforts had no effect). While Stoneburner and Low-Beer’s 
(2004) estimates suggested that the incidence of HIV among pregnant women 
peaked in the late 1980s, modelling the Ugandan AIDS epidemic using data and 
software from UNAIDS suggests that new adult HIV infections fell after 1983, 
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 Piot (2012: 175) also describes then-Ugandan health Minister Ruhakana Rugunda’s speech 
at the 1987 World Health Assembly as a ‘lone voice’ calling on his peers to face the reality of 
AIDS on the African continent. 
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well before Museveni came to power, and adult population prevalence reduced 
from 1988.6 
 
Figure 1: Epidemiological model for Uganda showing new adult HIV 
infections and adult HIV prevalence rate (1974-2004) with major political 
developments. 
 
 
It therefore seems more likely that large-scale behaviour change resulted from 
the visibility of illness and death (both of which had started to increase markedly 
by the early 1980s) than from the ‘zero grazing’ and ABC campaigns. 
                                           
6
 The estimates reported in Figure 1 were produced using UNAIDS’s Epidemiological 
Projection Package (UNAIDS, 2011) and HIV surveillance data from Ugandan antenatal 
clinics, with adult HIV prevalence estimates calibrated using national seroprevalence survey 
data from the Uganda HIV/AIDS Sero-Behavioural Survey 2004-2005 (Ministry of Health 
[Uganda] and ORC Macro, 2006). The full set of estimates produced by the model show that 
AIDS deaths continued to rise until 1995, and the fall in the HIV prevalence rate is explained 
by demographic changes and deaths exceeding new HIV infections. The model is reported 
fully elsewhere (Grebe, 2012: 186-194). 
Source: Own estimates using Spectrum/EPP 2011 (UNAIDS, 2011) and reported fully in 
Grebe (2012: 186-194). 
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While the Ugandan state took the lead in HIV prevention, it could draw on 
existing home-grown prevention responses from community groups, particularly 
in the rural areas which formed the epicentre of the epidemic (see Epstein, 
2007). By 1988 it was seeking to integrate the efforts of government and civil 
society (including NGOs, faith-based and community-based organisations), 
eventually resulting in the ‘multi-sectoral approach’ of the 1990s (Thornton, 
2008: 131). The state possessed extremely limited capacity to provide health 
services (there were few hospitals and even fewer that had the resources to 
provide good services). As a result, AIDS services in Uganda were pioneered by 
civil society, most prominently in the form of TASO, which was founded in 
1987 by a small group of volunteers and a few passionate healthcare workers 
(see next section). The government embraced and encouraged these efforts. 
TASO founder Noerine Kaleeba describes being brought into high-level policy-
making and says that the ‘terrain had been set’ for civil society to respond to 
AIDS (personal communication, 2010). 
Despite the questionable assumptions underlying the Ugandan government’s 
prevention ‘success story’, it did indeed provide leadership in two important 
ways: (1) by ensuring AIDS featured prominently on the national agenda, and 
(2) by building partnerships with civil society on prevention and care, and 
coordinating the work of a diverse set of actors, first through the NCPA and 
later through the national AIDS Control Programme and the Uganda AIDS 
Commission (UAC). This institutional framework and Uganda’s ‘multi-sectoral 
approach’ – including its failings – will be analysed in greater detail in the 
sections that follow. 
By the mid-2000s, Uganda was performing significantly better than expected 
(and better than most of its peers, most notably the much wealthier South 
Africa) in the provision of antiretroviral treatment, even if this progress was 
largely funded by donors and implemented by civil society organisations like 
TASO. Using a novel approach, Nattrass (2008) shows that Uganda performed 
significantly better than expected when regressing the country’s highly active 
antiretroviral therapy (HAART) coverage on its level of development, external 
resources, social characteristics, burden of disease and other predictors. She 
speculates that this may be related to ‘political leadership’. But while 
suggestive, this study was at too aggregated a level to distinguish between the 
contributions of government and that of civil society in determining the success 
of the AIDS response.  
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4. TASO’s birth and evolution: from volunteer 
network to professional service delivery 
organization 
 
In early 1987, a group of 16 men and women (the majority of whom were HIV-
positive) started meeting informally to share experiences and support one 
another in coping with the impact of HIV/AIDS on their lives (Ssebanja, 2007: 
1). Most were HIV-positive or had loved ones who were ill with or had died 
from AIDS. This included Noerine Kaleeba, the group’s leader, whose husband 
Christopher had died of AIDS shortly before.7 As the group grew, it formalised 
its structure and programme of ‘living positively’. Kaleeba, a charismatic and 
energetic individual, was principal of the School of Physiotherapy at Mulago 
Hospital and became TASO’s first director. She cites as motivation for the 
founding of TASO ‘a feeling of anger and frustration at the stigma and isolation 
of people with HIV and … the fact that families were abandoning their loved 
ones’ (personal communication: 2008). 
 
Medical services for AIDS patients were extremely limited. Dr Elly Katabira, a 
physician who had come across AIDS while working in Britain, was shocked to 
find large numbers of AIDS patients in Mulago Hospital when he returned to 
Kampala in 1986. He set up an outpatient clinic in late 1986 and opposed 
proposals for a segregated inpatient ward.8 In 1987, Katabira had been put in 
touch with the fledgling TASO and became a key figure in their integration of 
social support and community-based services with medical services. At the time 
no life-saving treatment for HIV/AIDS was available, and the founders were 
responding primarily to the human tragedy caused by widespread stigma and 
discrimination, both within the healthcare system and the wider community, 
which condemned patients to lonely and undignified deaths. They strove to 
enable patients to ‘die with dignity’ (Ssebanja, personal communication, 2008).  
 
                                           
7
 The previous year, she had visited Christopher in England where he had become ill and been 
diagnosed with AIDS. In a remarkable interview for the PBS documentary ‘The Age of 
AIDS’, she describes how she travelled to Geneva to meet Jonathan Mann, director of the 
WHO’s Global Programme on AIDS (see The Age of AIDS Parts 1 and 2, 2006). Her 
relationship with Mann would later prove valuable as TASO sought to mobilise international 
support. She brought Christopher back to Uganda, where he died in January 1987. 
8
 He was concerned that segregating AIDS patients would exacerbate stigma and 
discrimination by marking AIDS as a ‘deadly and shameful disease’ and that a service outside 
the mainstream would not be sustainable (Katabira, personal communication, 2008). A 
highly-regarded physician and prominent advocate of a human rights approach to HIV/AIDS, 
he served as president of the International AIDS Society from 2010 to 2013. 
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TASO reached out to communities by visiting neighbourhoods to identify 
patients and running training workshops on caring for the ill at home. It tackled 
stigma and discrimination by talking openly about AIDS and even the then-
chairman of the AIDS Control Programme attended one of its AIDS 
sensitisation workshops (Ssebanja, 2007: 17). The rapidly expanding 
organisation obtained office and counselling space at Mulago hospital, helped 
set up an HIV testing service and day-care clinic in Masaka and provided advice 
to healthcare workers. Initially it focused on providing counselling and 
psychosocial support, but increasingly responded to the weakness of the 
Ugandan healthcare system by providing medical services itself. Eventually 
TASO would operate 11 service centres throughout the country, administer 
Uganda’s largest antiretroviral treatment programme, provide care to over 
100,000 clients per year (TASO, 2014) and establish a number of ‘mini-TASOs’ 
in rural state facilities to help build capacity (Bukenya, 2012). 
 
TASO’s founders drew heavily on pre-existing interpersonal networks to build 
the movement. Personal friends and acquaintances, especially those formed 
within the Mulago teaching hospital, formed the core of the young organisation 
(Ssebanja, 2007). The group quickly drew in like-minded individuals and 
created links with outside actors. These included donors and charities 
(ActionAid was an important early supporter), AIDS activists and AIDS service 
organisations in other countries, like the UK-based Terrence Higgins Trust, from 
whom it obtained support and information. It is notable that Kaleeba and several 
other founders were educated professionals with significant social capital, 
comfortable in elite circles and able to hold their own among policymakers. The 
importance of personal ties during early movement-building is confirmed by 
frequent references to a ‘family spirit’ in the recollections of founders (personal 
communication, Kaleeba, 2008; P. Ssebanja, 2008). Dense interpersonal 
networks characterised by relationships of trust, domestic and transnational elite 
networks – including what Keck and Sikkink (1998) term ‘activist networks’ 
and interlinkages with professional and governmental networks – and 
deliberately constructed partnerships enabled TASO to mobilise support and 
gain influence. This ‘network of influence’ (see Grebe, 2012) acted as the 
scaffolding by means of which a coalition for an effective policy and 
programmatic response to AIDS could be built in Uganda. 
 
But movements and the broader coalitions they form rarely remain static. As 
will be shown in the next section, TASO’s evolution was shaped by the demands 
of its institutional context, including limited political space for activism. It was 
able to adapt to its circumstances and cope with an influx of resources and the 
intensifying demands of large-scale service delivery in part by formalising its 
structure and operations. Its leaders decided early on to build formal systems – it 
appointed professional managers and donors like USAID invested heavily in the 
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development of its technical capacity and managerial systems (Ayers, personal 
communication, 2008). These choices enabled it to become the successful 
service delivery organisation it is today, but were probably incompatible with 
the requirements of leading in civil society and of ‘holding government to 
account’. This is lamented by some of Uganda’s most prominent activists, like 
the International HIV/AIDS Alliance’s Milly Katana: 
 
‘[TASO] has lost the crowd. …TASO is riding on the back of its 
history… Of course it’s the biggest – outsiders trust it, value it, 
they give them more money and they are expanding services, 
which is great. But to me that doesn’t mean that they are leaders’ 
(Personal communication, 2008). 
 
 
5. Uganda’s ‘multi-sectoral partnership 
approach’ 
 
The Ugandan government realised that HIV required a society-wide response, 
and its efforts to encourage civil society through a ‘multi-sectoral’ approach 
found their clearest expression in the 1992 founding of the Uganda AIDS 
Commission. It presided over a very weak healthcare system without the 
capacity to care effectively for the deluge of AIDS patients. The country had just 
emerged from a long period of economic mismanagement and war that had 
decimated its infrastructure and economy. If the government were to stand a 
chance of successfully dealing with the impact of AIDS, it would need both 
international partners and local partners. TASO was not an activist movement 
representing AIDS patients and embracing it may have seemed a low-risk 
strategy to the Museveni government. TASO was provided with facilities at 
Mulago hospital (and later at hospitals throughout the country) and Noerine 
Kaleeba was appointed to the committee in charge of the AIDS Control 
Programme, apparently at the behest of President Museveni himself. 
 
Putzel (2004: 26) attributes the willingness of the Museveni regime to tackle 
AIDS head-on to several factors, including that it listened to medical experts, a 
desire to ‘put the epidemic beyond partisan politics’ and a ‘firm coalition behind 
the President’s HIV/AIDS campaign’. But the literature and interviews with key 
informants suggest two further critical factors: First, HIV/AIDS in the military 
represented a very real threat to the new government’s power base (De Waal, 
2006). Second, the new National Resistance Movement (NRM) government 
under Museveni’s leadership was heavily reliant on donors and needed to 
legitimate itself in the eyes of both the international community and the 
Ugandan public. Tumushabe (2006: 8) has argued that the Ugandan ‘success 
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story’ on HIV/AIDS became a critical ‘approval and marketing issue’ for the 
government. 
 
While the Ugandan government adopted a relatively open stance, and a sense of 
partnership characterised its relationship with civil society from early on, its 
motives were not necessarily entirely noble. Furthermore, political space for 
civil society activism is severely constrained: political and civil rights are weak9 
and, despite the reintroduction of competitive elections, the political system is 
perhaps best described as a form of ‘electoral authoritarianism’ (see Van de 
Walle, 2013) characterised by patronage-based ‘neopatrimonialist rule’ 
(Rubongoya, 2007), presidential and party dominance (Mwenda, 2007; 
Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey, 2013) and intolerance towards political 
opposition.10 TASO’s focus on delivering services to those with HIV (rather than 
the political mobilisation many AIDS movements in other countries chose – 
notably the Treatment Action Campaign in South Africa) probably reflects both 
the need to step in where the state was unable to provide the required services 
and a ‘political opportunity structure’ that limited its ability to pursue vocal 
activism (see Scholte, 2004: 229).  
 
Indeed, several Ugandan AIDS activists and civil society leaders have argued 
that TASO generally failed to lead in civil society and, in particular, failed to 
support efforts to hold government to account (personal communication, Katana, 
2008; Were, 2008). In contrast with more militant Ugandan AIDS activists, 
TASO leaders displayed a general unwillingness to acknowledge conflict with 
government or serious failures in governmental leadership during interviews. 
This seems to reflect a fear that open criticism would undermine TASO’s 
partnership with the Ugandan government and consequently threaten service 
delivery (which is predicated on access to hospital infrastructure, etc.). Several 
activist informants (outside TASO) interpreted TASO’s relative meekness as 
fear of losing access to state healthcare facilities and of threatening their 
partnership with healthcare authorities. This belies the conventional wisdom 
about Uganda’s ‘openness’ and ‘partnership approach’. 
                                           
9
 Freedom House political rights and civil liberties ratings for Uganda varied between 4 and 6 
over the period 1986 to 1995. Ratings are on a 7-point scale with 1 representing most free and 
7 least free. Uganda was classified as “partly free” throughout the period (Freedom House, 
2014). 
10
 For example, after Museveni’s former physician Kizza Besigye ran for president in 2001, 
Museveni’s campaign was characterised by open violence and intimidation, with Besigye 
fleeing into exile after the election and after the February 2011 elections, during which 
Museveni again defeated Besigye, brutal state repression met peaceful ‘walk to work’ protests 
over fuel prices, in which several people died and Besigye was arrested so violently that he 
had to be hospitalised in Kenya (Izama and Wilkerson, 2011: 64-65). More recently, the 
opposition mayor of Kampala was arrested repeatedly. 
11 
 
 
In recent years, governmental leadership on HIV/AIDS is perceived to have 
declined in quality and vigour. A number of respondents indicated that President 
Museveni seemed to have ‘withdrawn’ from the struggle, while others worried 
about shifts towards less progressive government policy on AIDS. 
Developments causing widespread concern included increased hostility to 
condom promotion, a proposed law that would criminalise deliberate HIV 
transmission and most recently the promulgation of the discriminatory Anti-
Homosexuality Act.
11
 
 
A puritanical and socially conservative agenda is not new in Uganda, and 
elements of it can be discerned even in the early discourse on HIV/AIDS from 
Museveni and his government. De Waal (2006: 98-105) points out that the 
lauded ‘ABC’ message of the Ugandan government has always been a mixed 
and inconsistent one, often tailored so as to please or avoid offending specific 
audiences. On numerous occasions the president has attacked condom 
promotion, especially to young people. The first lady, Janet Museveni (an 
outspoken ‘born-again’ Christian), has been particularly vigorous in her 
condemnation of condom promotion, telling an audience in the United States 
that ‘giving young people condoms is tantamount to giving them a license to go 
out and be promiscuous; it leads to certain death’ (Museveni, 2004). 
 
In the mid-2000s, the United States became (by far) the largest funder of 
Uganda’s AIDS efforts through the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief 
(PEPFAR). As an initiative of the Bush Administration, it came encumbered 
with policies rooted in a conservative religious agenda (such as reservation of 
funds for faith-based groups and abstinence-based prevention programmes). As 
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At the time of the fieldwork for this study the Anti-Homosexuality Bill had not yet been 
introduced. The bill was introduced by Member of Parliament David Bahati in October 2009 
as a private member’s bill. While same-sex relationships were already criminalised in Uganda 
(dating from British colonial rule), the bill would exacerbate repression and discrimination by 
introducing two new offences, ‘the offence of homosexuality’ carrying a penalty of life 
imprisonment and ‘aggravated homosexuality’ (defined to include homosexual acts with a 
minor or by a person who is HIV-positive), which would carry the death penalty. Despite 
strong condemnation from various quarters, including Ugandan lesbian, gay, bisexual and 
transgender activists and international human rights organisations, the bill received substantial 
support from the Ugandan public and in the Ugandan media. Criticism of it was framed as 
‘Western interference’ and as a battle over Uganda’s moral self-determination (Sadgrove et 
al., 2012: 105). The bill and the wave of homophobic sentiment expressed in the wake of its 
introduction seem to have tapped into a stridently socially and sexually conservative agenda 
in Uganda, which enjoys both public support and has powerful backers in the Museveni 
regime. The bill was eventually passed (in slightly less draconian form, which dropped the 
death penalty provisions) in late 2013 and signed into law in February 2014, to widespread 
international condemnation. 
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Epstein (2007: 185-201) shows, this conservative religious agenda found fertile 
ground in certain sections of Ugandan society, in particular a number of 
conservative church groups and the first lady, who led a backlash against 
condom promotion programmes. By 2008, this constituted a significant worry 
for civil society leaders, including the former director of TASO, Dr Alex 
Coutinho, who obliquely criticised the Museveni government by referring to its 
approach as ‘anti-condoms and a little bit pro-abstinence’ and argued that 
Museveni had to be brought back to the forefront of HIV prevention efforts 
(personal communication, 2008). 
Praise for Uganda’s relatively open and enabling attitude to civil society, and its 
multi-sectoral partnership approach, must therefore be tempered by 
acknowledgement of its authoritarianism, a cowed civil society and prevention 
policies undermined by a socially conservative agenda. 
The custodian of Uganda’s ‘multi-sectoral’ partnership approach and the body 
charged with coordinating the AIDS response, the UAC, was widely seen as 
being under the control of and serving the interests of the Museveni government. 
The UAC exercises its coordination role through a Partnership Forum (an annual 
meeting of stakeholders from all sectors) and a Partnership Committee, which 
meets regularly and makes decisions regarding issues such as resource 
allocation. The Partnership Committee also acts as the Country Coordinating 
Mechanism for the Global Fund and controls a joint Civil Society Fund (often 
referred to as a ‘basket fund’), through which pooled donor contributions are 
disbursed to civil society organisations.  
Sectors are organised into ‘self-coordinating entities’ (see Figure 2) that are 
supposed to develop joint policy positions and present these to the Partnership 
Committee on behalf of their constituencies. While there are twelve such 
entities, the primary function of the partnership mechanism is to coordinate the 
work of international, domestic and faith-based civil society organisations, 
donors and government. At the district level there exists a similar set of 
structures known as District AIDS Coordination Committees, with 
representation from the political leadership of the district, government 
departments, local civil society organisations, the private sector and people 
living with HIV/AIDS. 
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Figure 2. ‘Partnership mechanism’ of the Uganda AIDS Commission 
. 
 
 
The Director General of the UAC at the time of the fieldwork for this study (Dr 
David Apuuli) argued that these structures were uniquely able to foster 
cooperation and coordination in the HIV/AIDS response because the Ugandan 
government is compelled by law to meet and come to joint decisions with 
donors, civil society and other stakeholders (personal communication,  2008). In 
reality, however, neither the UAC nor its partnership mechanism is independent 
of government. All commissioners are appointed by President Museveni, its 
Director General was described by independent civil society leaders as highly 
protective of the President’s interests and the UAC itself seen as ineffective in 
discharging its coordinating function (personal communication, Katana,  2008; 
Were, 2008; Mworeko, 2008). The creation of the Civil Society Fund was 
widely perceived as an attempt to gain control over donor funds for civil society 
in order to deny resources to organisations critical of the government, a fact that 
activist Beatrice Were argued was central to the UAC’s failings (personal 
communication, 2008). 
The unwillingness of large civil society organisations like TASO to openly 
criticise the government, the UAC or their major donors (most significantly 
PEPFAR) seems to confirm that these fears were not entirely unfounded. 
Donors have substantial influence on policies and programmes in countries that 
are heavily dependent on foreign aid (Mayhew, 2002). This is particularly true 
in Uganda, where the majority of spending on AIDS-related programmes are 
financed externally and even state agencies like the UAC and programmes in the 
Ministry of Health rely on foreign donors for the bulk of their funding. Over the 
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period 2003/4 to 2008/9, external financing accounted for 84-98% of HIV/AIDS 
expenditure (Lule and Haacker, 2012: 250). TASO is the major provider of 
medical services to HIV/AIDS patients, including the vast majority of 
antiretroviral therapy, and obtains all of its funding from international donors. 
The influence of donors may serve to broker effective AIDS response coalitions 
or to inhibit their formation. Their clout in Uganda has allowed donors to push 
for an inclusive partnership approach (between government and civil society) 
and for an enabling environment that would allow civil society to participate 
effectively in the AIDS response. But, paradoxically, in the process donors 
helped inhibit the development of a vocal and independent civil society sector 
capable of exerting pressure on the state and holding it accountable. 
The influence of donors is felt in a number of ways: through direct 
conditionalities imposed on the receiving state and choices over which 
programmes and organisations to fund, but also more subtly through the 
competition over resources between the state and civil society as well as within 
civil society. The clout of donors is demonstrated by the resolution of a 
disagreement between TASO and the government over who was to provide the 
bulk of antiretroviral therapy, which was decided in TASO’s favour largely 
because this was the preference of PEPFAR (Coutinho, personal 
communication, 2008). 
In situations where civil society is not well-developed or the political culture and 
institutions inhibit openness and broad participation in policy formulation and 
implementation, the potential for donors to broker inclusive coalitions is 
particularly significant. Keck and Sikkink (1998) describe a ‘boomerang pattern’ 
of influence, in which civil society organisations can obtain leverage over the 
state in situations where direct channels between it and the state are blocked. 
International allies (usually Northern NGOs, but sometimes intergovernmental 
organisations or donors) can bring pressure to bear from outside, either directly 
or via Northern states. De Waal (2006: 58-59) argues that this pattern is 
responsible for much of the success of AIDS activism in Africa, where domestic 
activists have been able to exploit transnational networks comprising 
international NGOs, intergovernmental organisations (including those of the UN 
system such as UNAIDS) and, crucially, donor governments, as a means of 
leverage over their own governments. The Ugandan state’s lack of capacity in 
the late 1980s, and its resulting dependence on donors and civil society 
organisations to provide public services, was arguably the primary factor in its 
adoption of a partnership approach. 
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However, the fieldwork conducted for this paper also points to significant risks 
associated with powerful donors. Donors may dominate the agenda, inhibiting 
open engagement and limiting the ability of domestic actors to build ‘locally-
appropriate coalitions’ – in Leftwich and Hogg’s (2007) terminology. The Bush 
Administration used financial assistance to advance a particular ideological 
agenda in alliance with sections of the domestic elite. Many civil society leaders 
reported that donors were overly concerned with maintaining their partnership 
with the state, and consequently failed to support, and even actively (if 
inadvertently) undermined, the development of an independent and critical civil 
society sector. 
 
 
6. Concluding thoughts 
While serious conceptual and analytical difficulties attach to the notion of 
leadership, effective ‘AIDS leadership’ can be meaningfully described as the 
mobilisation of coalitions around AIDS prevention and treatment. A broad 
coalition that includes civil society, the state and the international community 
has helped Uganda to mobilise one of the more effective AIDS responses in 
Africa. It has performed admirably in providing antiretroviral treatment, even if 
the effectiveness of its prevention efforts has sometimes been exaggerated. 
The choices of individuals, including political leaders like Museveni and civil 
society leaders like Kaleeba, were arguably as important as broader institutional 
factors in shaping Uganda’s AIDS response. The theoretical construct of 
‘networks of influence’ stand at the nexus of agency and structure, and is 
therefore useful for thinking about the processes involved in building coalitions 
for an inclusive and vigorous response. But the history of TASO also 
demonstrates how political and institutional context shaped the choices of 
individuals and constrained opportunities for coalition-building.  
Weak state capacity left the Museveni government little choice but to pursue an 
‘open’ and supportive policy with respect to civil society, but an authoritarian 
political culture that discourages open criticism and dissent has limited the 
ability of civil society to hold the state accountable and influence policy. Donors 
may inadvertently have undermined the independence of civil society. However, 
their power has also at times provided a lever for exerting influence over the 
state and probably limited the extent and intensity of state repression.  
This research demonstrates that state-civil society partnerships – undergirded by 
effective civil society organisations, a supportive state and donor pressure – can 
help establish effective AIDS response coalitions. However, enhancing state 
accountability under authoritarian regimes remains a formidable challenge. 
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